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THE ALLENDE REGIME IN CHILE: AN
HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS: PART m
by Eugenio Velasco
In early June, 1976, the Organization of American States met in
Santiago, Chile. The main topic for that meeting was human rights in
the Western Hemisphere. On the 8th and 9th of June, a thirteen page
letter (dated June 6, 1976) was distributed to all of the ministers of
foreign affairs attending the meeting. This letter was written and
signed by five practicing Chilean lawyers. It set forth, openly and in
great detail, the collective experience of the five lawyers with respect to
extensive and systematic violations of human rights in Chile. One of
the authors of this letter was Eugenio Velasco, Professor Emeritus of the
University of Chile, member of the Chilean Academy of the Social
Sciences, ex-Dean, ex-Director and ex-Professor of Law in the Law
School of the University of Chile, and ex-Ambassador of Chile in
Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco; another author was Jaime Castillo,
University of Chile Professor, ex-Minister of Justice and ex-representa-
tive of Chile before the Human Rights Commission of the United
Nations.
On August 6, 1976, both Eugenio Velasco and Jaime Castillo were
violently arrested and, without a hearing of any kind, were swiftly.
expelled from Chile by unidentified civilians working for the military
government. The reason subsequently given by the government for the
expulsion was that the presence of the two lawyers in Chile represented
a "threat to national security."
Presently, Eugenio Velasco is Visiting Professor of Law, UCLA Law
School.
I. WHY A PEACEFUL TRANSFER OF POWER WAS
NOT POSSIBLE IN CHILE
A. The Program of the U.P. and the Election
In my first lecture I described some aspects of Chilean life and of the
constitutional and legal situation as of the 3rd of November, 1970, when
the National Congress elected Salvador Allende as President of the
Republic. In the second lecture, I analyzed the principal constitutional
and legal violations carried out by the Popular Unity government, which
provoked its overthrow by a military coup on September 11, 1973. This
put an end to the most solid and stable democracy of Latin America.
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In the third and final lecture of this series, I shall examine the reasons
that impelled Allende's government to act as it did; why the innumera-
ble efforts to try to maintain the government within a constitutional
framework failed; and why the publicized thesis of the unique experi-
ment of turning a nation towards Marxist socialism through free elec-
tions in a legal way, failed, and in its failure destroyed Chile's history of
democracy and freedom.
I will try to be objective, but obviously my interpretation cannot be
neutral, because my personal view is inseparable from my own ideologi-
cal formation. That is why I must start out by telling you that I have
belonged, since I was a young man, to the Radical Party, although I
dedicated my life to the university and only started acting in politics in
1972. The Radical Party has a social democratic tendency; in Chile, it
seeks fundamental changes in the socio-economic structure of the
country in order to establish a more just society in which poverty and
ignorance were eradicated, in which the privileges of classes or groups
would disappear, and in which everyone had equal access to a dignified
life and to the development of their spiritual values in a framework of
liberty and democracy. To reach these objectives, we think that the
state must control and manage important economic activities that are
vital for development through a "social area of economy." We also
believe that a "private area" must exist to allow the development of
intelligence and individual abilities and to make possible political free-
dom. However, this freedom must be maintained within, and super-
vised by, the general plans of the state to avoid exploitation and to
benefit the interests of the society. We think it improper for capital
to exploit the proletariat by simply buying its labor and that, for the
same reasons, the workers must have participation in the administration
and profits of the companies where they work in order to gradually
create "workers' companies" within the private area. By "workers" we
mean the blue-collar workers and employees, professionals, technicians
and managers. In other words, we think that labor must predomi-
nate over capital and that work may utilize, in its benefit, the necessary
capital by paying a fair interest. All this is to occur within a system
which strictly respects freedom in all its aspects, the existence of political
parties, free and secret elections, and the periodic replacement of the
authorities by the people.
I want to remind you that in 1970 Chile was the most politically
advanced country in Latin America. It had a high rate of literacy and
school attendance and a wide and democratic political participation of
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the people (the electors were forty percent of the inhabitants); its econo-
my was relatively industrialized and its per capita income was the third
highest in Latin America after Argentina and Venezuela, but with a
much fairer distribution than Venezuela. It had a high degree of
socialization and state intervention, apart from the existence of impor-
tant companies belonging to the state.'
By the end of Frei's presidency, although the rate of inflation was
over thirty percent per year, participation of workers in the total economy
had reached almost fifty-five percent.
From a Marxist point of view, this reality was not a form of socialism
but "state capitalism," but without a doubt, it facilitated the way to
Marxism. Remember, the large majority of the country-I would say
three-fourths of the people-wanted profound structural changes to
achieve greater justice through economic development, a fairer distribu-
tion of wealth and the eradication of the poverty which still existed for
many Chileans.
But among this majority, the differences between the Marxists and
non-Marxists were evident. The Marxists wanted to establish a
Marxist-Leninist regime while the non-Marxists wanted to reach
their objectives within a democracy, freedom and the existence of diver-
gent political parties. Although the Marxist parties had increased their
strength, and gave the appearance of great support because of their
incessant activity, they still did not amount to thirty percent of the
electors.
Within this general frame, and conscious of Chile's undeniable legal-
istic and democratic tradition, the Marxists created the U.P. coalition
with the collaboration of small groups with democratic leftist tendencies.
The most important of these groups was the Radical Party, already
divided and weakened, but still prestigious. Yet even within this party,
many members feared this alliance with the U.P. because of the enor-
mous power wielded by the Marxists.
Not long before the presidential election, the U.P. decided to give first
priority to the elaboration of its program; thereafter it would select its
presidential candidate. As explained previously, that program was not
Marxist. In the economic field, for example, it was very similar to the
social democratic postulates of the Radical Party; and in the political
field, it proposed making democracy more profound, and guaranteed
1. The following figures, corresponding to the period immediately preceeding Allende's
election, are eloquent: the public or state sector generated forty percent of the internal
product; it paid thirty-three percent of the total wages; it directly made half of the coun-
try's investments and, directly and indirectly, contributed to seventy percent of the in-
vestments.
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respect for the Constitution, freedom, political parties and even, as it
expressly established, the opposition.
In order to select the U.P.'s candidate, each party in the U.P. coalition
presented a pre-candidate. Thereafter, in a "round-table," utilizing a
great number of voting processes, pre-candidates were eliminated. At
one point it appeared that the Radical Party pre-candidate might obtain
the votes necessary to be the U.P. candidate, but the Communist Party
vetoed him openly, stating that the coalition's candidate had to be a
Marxist.
Many members of the Radical Party, including myself, thought that
because the rules of the game had not been respected the Party should
have left the U.P. The Party had been offended, and it had become
evident that the Marxists had hidden intentions and were planning to
exceed their own program After months of having held that the im-
portant thing was the program and its goals, and not the candidate
himself, there could be no other explanation for their demand that the
candidate had to be Marxist. But, the leaders of the Radical Party ac-
cepted the Communist veto and backed Socialist Allende, who was
thus chosen to be the U.P. candidate.
I do not wish to appear as a prophet, but at that time the direction of
the U.P. seemed clear to me and I openly proclaimed it. It was clear
that the U.P. wanted to use the Radical Party and other non-Marxist
groups to give an appearance of broad-based support for its non-
Marxist program. But, with a Marxist President, basically backed by
two Marxist-Leninist parties and with democratic allies that had demon-
strated their submissiveness and lack of personality, it was clear that the
government would adopt a Marxist position. Only because more than
seventy percent of the Chileans were not Marxist had the U.P. tried to
present a non-Marxist program. It seemed probable that, given these
factors, the U.P. would be nothing more than a political fraud.
Another very important fact was that within the Socialist Party, to
which Allende belonged, there were two distinct factions fighting for a
position of predominance. One was formed by those who favored the
"pacific and legal route," the route to power through elections; the other
was formed by those who favored the "armed route." This latter group
followed the orthodox Marxist position that revolutionary violence is
both unavoidable and legitimate in fighting against the repressive and
armed "bourgeois state." During the Socialist Convention of 1967,
Allende had been the leader of the group that defended the "pacific and
legal route." Within the party, his group had lost to the group favoring
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the "armed route." The disciplined and strong Communist Party fa-
vored Allende's position. .Because of their position and support, Al-
lende, a representative of the minority wing in his own party, paradoxi-
cally became the presidential candidate of the U.P.
Thus, during the campaign and in the first months of the U.P.
government, the famous "Chilean road to socialism" was born and
developed. It was defined by Allende himself as a new and original
route, unique in the world. Pursuant to this plan, the Chilean people
would build a socialist society within the Constitution and the law, with
ideological and partisan pluralism, and with complete freedom. The
"Chilean road to socialism" would skip the stage of the dictatorship of
the proletariat. This new society would be a different one, a curious
mixture of democratic and humanistic Marxism. Quoting Allende's
words, Chilean socialism "would taste of red wine and empanadas."
Personally, I was never able to understand this non-Marxist Marxism;
but the "Chilean road" produced astonishment inside and outside of
Chile and attracted, no doubt, many democratic people to the U.P.
regime.'
2. In 1972, I wrote a number of newspaper articles. In one of them I said:
The Chilean road to socialism is a clich6 phrase that everyone must repeat if they
wish to avoid being called a reactionary. Even the heads of the parties who do not
believe in socialism make use of it in proclaiming the validity of this principle and
in protesting against acts of violence they claim infringe it.
It is necessary to notice that where the end of this road leads to has never been
clearly determined. The road is constantly mentioned, but care is taken, or was
taken, to avoid any mention of its objective. The transition to socialism by the
"Chilean road," it is said, is a unique case in the history of mankind because the
change from capitalist society to a socialist one is being carried out through pacific
and legal means ....
It is well known that there are different forms of socialism. Some of them com-
bine their essence with the idea of democracy and believe that both concepts
complement each other and are inseparable. Therefore, this type requires free
political parties; periodic elections through universal, free and secret suffrage;
independent state powers; respect for individual rights; and an economic structure
that assures justice for the majority and the eradication of the exploitation of one
person or class by another.
Other conceptions of socialism-all of them variations of the original Marxist
thought-propose the dictatorship of the proletariat, a single political organization
(the Communist Party), state ownership of all the means of production and,
therefore, the complete and totalitarian concentration of power in the Central
Committee of the Communist Party and its authorities. These conceptions entail
both a political and an economic dictatorship which are as inseparable for com-
munism as the ideas of socialism and democracy are for the other groups.
Which of these types of socialism is the goal of the "Chilean road?" This has
never been clarified, either by the President or any other authority of the regime.
Quite to the contrary, until a few months ago, they have been carefully vague and
confusing, because in such vagueness and confusion lies the key to painless indoc-
trination.
Many people today feel part of the "Chilean road to socialism" without realizing
that it is an ideological smuggling and, therefore, constitutes a huge collective
deception.
The secret documents of the Communist and Socialist parties that are being
exposed to public light; the direct comparisons of the Chilean process to the
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If you recall what I said previously about the U.P.'s strategy of
violating the laws in order to form a "social area" of the economy
aimed towards complete state control of economic activity in Chile,
ignoring a Congress with a non-Marxist majority and ignoring the
Democratic Guarantees Constitutional Amendment, you might con-
include with me that this strategy was a principal cause of Chile's
serious institutional crisis. The solid democratic structure of the
country was taken advantage of by the U.P. to obtain the presidency,
and then, having achieved power through a deceitfully democratic pro-
gram, they attempted to destroy that structure from the inside in order
to establish a Marxist-Leninist regime that the majority of the nation
rejected. This had never occurred in Chile, and I am sure that no
democracy could resist this experience.
It is clear to me that a constitutional system, for its normal and
efficient functioning, requires, among other things, good faith and
honesty in the application of the rules that define the system. The legal
order is not something dead and static. It lives, but only in harmony
with those who apply it and give it life. It cannot survive when the
authorities secretly wish to destroy it.
At the same time, it is impossible to deny that a particular constitu-
tional norm helped the process. I refer to the rule, already analyzed,
that placed in the hands of Congress the election of the President of the
Republic between the two candidates who obtained the highest relative
majorities when none of the candidates obtained an absolute majority.
We saw that Congress had always elected the candidate who had
obtained the most votes. This tradition was logical; the majority of
Congress-not of the citizens--did not feel authorized to elect the
second most popular candidate. This tradition had become so impor-
tant, that a serious problem could exist if it was not followed. There-
fore, the Christian Democracy decided to sustain this tradition and
vote for Allende so long as the Democratic Constitutional Guarantees
Amendment was approved.
Given the fact that seventy-five percent of the Chilean people were not
Marxist, a constitutional system that made possible the election of a
Russian and the Cuban revolutions, designed to emphasize the difference between
the means but not the end of the road; the articles in the Communist newspaper
about the "transitory" nature of solutions that the U.P. program proclaimed as
"definite" and, above all, the fact that the government and the Popular Unity have
removed their mask in order to face openly the task of achieving ends never men-
tioned in the U.P. program, can leave no doubt that the "Chilean road to socialism"
represents today the least peaceful and legal way to reach the dictatorship of the
proletariat, state control of the economy and the suppression of political parties
and a free Congress.
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candidate who represented only a small minority with totally discrepant
ideas was absurd. Unfortunately, the system of a runoff in a direct
election, as in France, could not be applied in Chile due to political
passions. Such a system, as I already explained, would have been
preferable and would have alleviated political problems. If the citi-
zens were to choose the runoff candidate who had been second in the
first election they would have performed an unobjectionable sovereign
act.
B. The Attitude of the U.P. Government
There were other things that contributed to the demise of Chilean
democracy. First, the sectarianism of the government and the Marxist
parties, as well as their growing boldness, led them to denounce all
those who were not devoted to the government as being C.I.A. agents,
as having sold out to imperialism or as being fascist and anti-patriotic.
Second, the extreme left groups, that did not form part of the U.P.
coalition, but were close to the regime and whose principal leaders had
family ties with the outstanding personalities of the government, tried to
increase the conflicts in industry and agriculture by organizing and di-
recting "take-overs." The government officially condemned these groups,
and their actions, but that was all. In my opinion, the regime sincerely
repudiated these acts, but it was afraid of being accused of being
"traitors" to the revolution if it acted to stop them. Insecurity and
distrust reached incredible proportions. At one point a high ranking
extremist authority threatened to have Santiago's residential areas invad-
ed and ransacked by thousands of workers who lived in shanty towns
unless opposition to the regime stopped. The natural reaction of the
threatened residents was to obtain arms and to form clandestine militias
to fend off possible attacks.
But this was not the only armed faction in Chile. It was widely
known that many factory workers were receiving weapons from the most
extremist groups with the assistance of the government, which had
allowed such groups to manufacture and import the weapons. In re-
sponse, the opposition introduced a bill in Congress, subsequently passed,
forbidding the possession of weapons by any groups other than the
armed forces and the police. The armed forces were in charge of en-
forcing this law. The President, against his wishes did not veto the law,
because a veto would have offended the armed forces. The govern-
ment probably did not realize that this law would be of great assistance
to the military in carrying out their coup. Months before the bill
was enacted they had already begun searching for weapons. Thousands
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of weapons were discovered by the armed forces, which still claims
to be discovering such stocks today.
Five months after Allende assumed the presidency, a general election
of city councilmen ("regidores") took place. In the election the gov-
ernment obtained fifty percent of the votes. Apparently, its voting power
had increased considerably in the short time since the presidential elec-
tion. *But, this "increase" simply reflected an old political habit in
Chile. Due to the different lengths of terms for the president, senators,
congressmen and councilmen, it was usual that shortly after each presi-
dential election another general election took place. This election was
either to elect congressmen or city councilmen. As an empirical fact
in such elections, the number of votes for the party of the recently
elected president always increased over the votes for the party in the
presidential election. It was the manner in which the Chilean electors
expressed confidence and support for the new president, and probably
was a reflection of the typical human weakness of trying to get close to
those who obtain power.
In Allende's case, we have to add other facts: democratic peace and
legality had not yet been threatened; the "Chilean road to socialism" still
appeared as an attractive dream; and, above all, there had been an
economic "boom" in the first few months of Allende's government. This
boom had been achieved by an increased utilization of industrial capaci-
ties, caused by an increase in consumer demand produced by substantial
wage increases, especially for the low-income sectors. The early wage
and price policy of the government increased the purchasing power of
the poorer sectors and produced a more just distribution of income.
This first electoral triumph, however, was interpreted by the govern-
ment as an unconditional backing by the people. The interpretation
gave initial impulse to, and later on fed, the abuses and illegalities I have
analyzed.
Subsequent elections showed the uniqueness of the electoral "victo-
ry" of the U.P. mentioned above. Because of the death of a deputy, a
special election was called in July, 1971, in Valparaiso, Chile's second
largest city. In this election the candidate of the opposition won; the
government candidate obtaining only forty-eight percent of the votes.
At the beginning of 1972, in two special elections, the government was
defeated and its electoral strength clearly diminished. Despite these
losses, the position of the U.P. became even more hardened.
Soon, in all the elections carried out in Chile the repudiation of the
government began to increase within organizations of popular bases and
[Vol. 9
THE ALLENDE REGIME: PART HI
of clear political significance, such as trade unions, different types of
communities and student organizations. In these elections, the
winners usually were candidates whose platforms were based solely on
their opposition to the U.P. However, the government seemed to ignore
all of this. Its totalitarian position continued to harden and on several
occasions, when the defeat of government supporters produced great
impact because of the election's importance, it looked for an excuse to
falsify or to ignore the results. Sometimes, the supporters of the U.P.
even created parallel organizations controlled by the Marxist parties.
This happened, for example, in the elections of the Confederation of
Workers (C.U.T.), the most 4mportant union of the country, and in the
elections of the Secondary Schools Federation. In the case of the
University of Chile Student Federation, an organization of great tradi-
tion and influence, the U.P. refused to permit the election to take place.
How could all this happen in a country like Chile? Within the
government, two clear currents fought for predominance. One was
formed by extremists who favored violence and wanted to accelerate the
transformation process, acquiring total power and crushing the opposi-
tion in order to impose, as soon as possible, a Leninist-Marxist dictator-
ship. This current was formed by those who, within the Socialist Party,
had favored the "armed route" and by small groups of "ultras," such as
the Left Revolutionary Movement (M.I.R.), who wanted to follow Fidel
Castro's path. The other current wanted to proceed slowly, consolidat-
ing each step, in the search for "total power" while maintaining institu-
tionality and legality as much as possible. This current was mainly
formed by communists. Possibly Allende was in this line. The differ-
ence between the two currents was in the means, not in the end, for both
wanted to establish Leninist-Marxism.
As it always appears to have happened in history, the first group
radicalized the process and the second group was unable to prevent the
radicalization. To the, contrary, in order to maintain its revolutionary
colors, the second current was quite often forced to agree with the
extremists.
In March, 1973, the opposition obtained an enormous majority in
the general congressional elections. But it failed to reach a two-thirds
majority, a questionable electoral objective, set prior to the election
with a great display of publicity by an extreme right-wing party. The
opposition's failure to reach this "goal" allowed Allende to claim a vic-
tory for his government and, therefore, he would maintain his position of
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establishing socialism in Chile. This socialism was for him-as we have
already seen-nothing but Leninist-Marxism.
Together with this sad political picture, the economic state of the
country could hardly have been worse. I must be honest and admit that
I have not yet been able clearly to understand the reasons for this
incredible process. Possibly, we will never know them. The fact is that
in two and one-half years the national economy was totally destroyed
through the most incredible mistakes. It was no longer a matter of
doctrinal disagreement with a Marxist solution by the non-Marxist ma-
jority. From any point of view, whether Marxist or conservative, the
economic measures of the government were simply unexplainable.
Once, in a private conversation, I heard a diplomat from a Marxist
country say with annoyance: "This is not Marxism. This is only
clumsiness that will lead to chaos."
My doubts about this economic disaster refer to the reasons that led
the government to act in the way it did. The alternative explanations
are simple: the government was either extremely inept, or it coldly
planned economic bankruptcy to use the resulting chaos to obtain "total
power" by means of a social revolution directed by the government
itself. Even now, after all this time, I am still unable to clarify my
doubts.
However, a few examples may help you to formulate your thoughts.
The thousands of "take-overs" of farms, which the government tolerated
by refusing to assist the dispossessed owners, and the illegal interven-
tions it immediately ordered, led to chaos in the agricultural sector. The
"commandeered" farms were not cultivated because they were occupied
generally by untrained extremists who had no means of working the
land and who only worried about being ready to fight off a "retake-
over." Sometimes, in order to survive, the invaders slaughtered the
pure-bred cattle, including prized bulls. On the other hand, many of
the owners who still retained control of their farms, ceased to work their
land because they feared an imminent "take-over" and obviously did not
want to invest any money in their farms in case the "take-over" did
occur.
In summary, the Chilean countryside, because of the government's
passivity, looked like a jungle where the strongest imposed their law.
The inevitable result was that agricultural production rapidly decreased
to extremes unknown in Chile. Thus, in one year, Chile had to import
over 400 million dollars worth of wheat and meat, and, in the following
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year, the value of the importation of foodstuffs approached 600 million
dollars.8
In the industrial area the situation was as follows: the great number
of factories, companies and mines illegally "requisitioned" or "inter-
vened" in an irrational manner as previously explained, were man-
aged as part of the "social area." Frequently, the engineers and other
professionals and technicians who had been their executives were
replaced by "party comrades" who had no preparation or experience.
4
At the same time, in order to do a political favor or to achieve full
employment rates, the number of workers was increased without limita-
tion. At times, personnel increases reached 100 percent. During the
political campaign for the 1973 congressional election, I saw a small
"requisitioned" factory where the number of workers was so large that
they physically did not fit in it; thus they had to take turns, while some
worked, others played soccer.5
To cover losses and to be able to pay salaries, thus avoiding complete
industrial paralysis, Allende's government continued to print more paper
money. This was one of the causes of an inflation that reached astro-
nomic rates never before seen in Chile. At the same time, the lack of
supplies increased, manifesting itself in the long lines formed even
to buy cigarettes. And, in the Central Bank, the last dollars were being
spent.
In August of 1973, the political struggle had reached the breaking
point. The constitutional and legal violations had reached extremes.
Violence was widespread in the country and in the city streets. The
economy had reached its lowest point and the country was paralyzed
from Arica to Punta Arenas by a strike of truckers, merchants, man-
agers, union members and professionals; a bloody civil war seemed
inevitable.
Cardinal Silva Henriquez, head of the Chilean Roman Catholic
Church, invited the government and the Christian Democrat Party, the
most powerful opposition party, to a dialogue, in order to prevent the
3. As soon as the military coup stopped this crazy situation simply by re-establishing
order, agricultural production increased 20 percent in a year.
4. I know of cases where workers who barely knew how to read and write replaced
engineers with years of experience as managers of technologically modem factories.
5. Given these facts nobody should be surprised that the U.P. Minister of Finance
himself officially admitted, at the beginning of 1973, that during 1972 the companies
incorporated into the "social area" through "requisitions" and "interventions" had pro-
duced a net loss of 50,000 million escudos. Before the U.P., the net profit of these
companies had reached a similar amount.
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catastrophe that everybody saw coming. Both parties accepted the
invitation, but no agreement was reached. The government's intransi-
gence in its decision to continue along the same route to Leninist-
Marxism made any understanding impossible. The results of this stale-
mate are now history.
C. CONCLUSION
Some people think that the Constitution of 1925 contributed to the
crisis because it permitted the existence of a minority executive. Per-
haps, with a well conceived parliamentary regime, as the English one, in
which it is mandatory that the executive be a representative of the
congressional majority, Allende would have been forced to form a
majoritarian government. I do not share this opinion. It is true that an
anomaly existed in the Constitution, but a government of clear demo-
cratic formation does not need rules to force it to act according to the
wishes of the majority. That is the essence of democracy. Many
presidents have shifted their political plans in order to obtain the back-
ing of Congress.
On the contrary, the fact is that a president who did not want to com-
promise and who stubbornly insisted in leading the country in a way
that the enormous majority repudiated, would not have changed his
course simply because of a constitutional rule. Allende always had the
chance to form a progressive government supported by the majority of
the Chilean people. But for that, he would have had to abide by the
rules of democracy and of the Constitution and to reach an agreement
with non-Marxist parties. However, the extremist Marxists never allowed
him to do this. Allende either did not dare, or did not want to break
with them.
If I were to summarize why in Chile a peaceful solution to the crisis
created by the U.P. government was not possible, my opinion would
be that the reason lay in the totalitarian and anti-democratic essence of
Marxism. Having knowingly been elected to the presidency by a
minority of Chileans, the U.P. nevertheless wanted to acquire "total
power" by any means, and to lead the country where it did not want to
go. Any political agreement of a democratic nature would have meant
giving up, for many years, its efforts to establish in Chile a Leninist-
Marxist dictatorship. Who could predict when, if ever, a Marxist
would again be elected President of Chile? Thus, Marxism preferred
to fight until it either succeeded or fell, even if that meant the destruc-
tion of the strongest democracy in Latin America and in the entire
developing world.
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This explains the reasons for the coup of September 11, 1973. It
would be a falsehood to say now that the majority of Chile did not feel a
sense of peace and relief at that time. Because the coup did not appear
to be the work of a "strong man," but was an institutional reaction of
the armed forces, it led most Chileans to believe that the nation would
very soon return to democracy and to the rule of law, both of which
were held so highly in esteem by the Chilean people.
In effect, all the military declarations coincided in expressing that,
despite their professionalism and sense of constitutionality, the armed
forces had been compelled to intervene and to put an end to the chaos
and institutional breakdown proclaimed by Congress, the judiciary
and the Contraloria, with the goal of returning the country to a state of
democracy, legality and freedom. The very night of the coup, Septem-
ber 11, 1973 all of the members of the Junta declared this to the
country on the national television channel. The most emphatic member
of the Junta was General Mendoza, who said:
In this important moment of decision, the Chilean Police Force, in
forming part of the Junta that today has assumed command on the
Nation, has as its objective, the re-establishment of the judicial order
that recently has been seriously violated. It is not a question of crush-
ing tendencies or ideological positions, nor is it a question of personal
revenge; it is a question of re-establishing public order and returning
the country to the path of the Constitution and the law. Therefore,
the spirit of the Junta is to return to the real route of legality.
Edict Number Five of the military government stated that the armed
forces assumed "power only for the period of time required by circum-
stances." In Law Decree Number One, which formed the Junta, it was
clearly stated that the armed forces had assumed control of the nation
"with the patriotic commitment of restoring the broken Chilean spirit,
justice and institutionality, aware that this is the only way to be faithful
to the national traditions." And, on October 10, 1973, the new
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Admiral Huerta, in his address to the
United Nations General Assembly said in the name of the Junta:
The armed forces and the police have assumed the task of guiding
the country along the path of law and freedom. Once our goal is
achieved, we will not hesitate a minute in retreating to our headquarters
and ships. The period of return to normality will be as short as
possible, and it will depend, to a great extent, upon the efforts of all
Chileans in such a noble task.
But only a year and a half after the coup the military authorities
were already saying that they were concerned with objectives and
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not periods of time, that politics and the politicians ruined the coun-
try, not only during the U.P. government, but long before it, and that
today only the armed forces are capable of governing Chile. Among
their objectives, that the most important one was the economic de-
velopment of the country.
Stressing once again the necessity of preparing a new generation of
politicians to receive power within a pure nationalism, General Pinochet,
leader of the Junta, proclaimed in a speech delivered to the nation's
youth on March 1, 1975:
Some interested parties say that this is an emergency government. It
is not. They have not understood the problem. This is a government
of national salvation, whose mission is to remove the country from the
chaos in which it was immersed for many years . . . . The present
government . . . will not be a simple vacuum cleaner, used to clean
the country to have it ready for the return of the politicians. In three
years we would be again in chaos . . . . The government will be for
a well prepared and well intentioned youth. This youth will receive
an absolutely clean state.
You can imagine the profound impact of these events on all Chileans.
You can also imagine why they are even more painful for someone
like myself who has dedicated his whole adult life to the teaching and
practice of law. As a long-time professor of law, I would like to con-
clude these remarks by stating that this hard and terrible experience has
served to reinforce in me my dedication to the law. The things that I had
thought concerning our civilization and values, have been brutally dem-
onstrated in reality. What had I imagined that has come to pass?
Simply stated, it is that the juridical order and respect for law, especially
the indispensable guarantees of individual human rights and liberties,
constitute the necessary framework to control our innate animalistic
nature. This framework has been the result of many thousands of
years of man's search for the principles of justice and progress. When
these principles are concretely embodied in a system of laws, which
are in fact respected and practiced, man can develop the noble and
elevated spiritual values of love and kindness, and a consciousness
of justice and tolerance. It is hard to destroy the rule of law, es-
pecially when, as in the case of Chile, it is backed by a strong tra-
dition. In such cases, one knows when and where the destruction
starts, but not where it leads. The result, unfortunately, seems to be
that the bestiality which lays within many men is released, to rejoice in
brutality,
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The goal, therefore, is a new conquest of the juridical order, to
be used as a means to justice. Students of the law: I invite you
to develop whatever political ideas you honestly and freely believe
in. But never forget that a well conceived juridical order must support
and guide man's endeavors, and that that order must also be respected
and maintained. The destruction of that order and the violation
of the principles of justice, which should be the basis of human society,
always leads to tragedy. Therefore, I believe that the role of the
real lawyer is, and will continue to be, essential to man and society.
And, I continue to believe, despite the Chilean tragedy, that the princi-
ples of law, liberty, justice, democracy and human dignity, if diligently
and courageously fought for, will survive.
